UNDERSTANDING THE POLICY SUPPORT INSTRUMENT OF THE IMF:

Abstract
The plethora of acronyms in the IMF has a new addition- the ‘PSI’. On October 17, 2005,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved Nigeria’s request for a Policy Support
Instrument (PSI), thereby documenting Nigeria as the first user of the new IMF program.
Following the approval of the PSI, Nigeria signed an agreement with its Paris Club
creditors on October 20 2005 under which approximately 60% of its $30bn debt was
written off on Naples terms, with the remainder to be paid back in two tranches over 6
months. Obtaining approval for its economic reform program through the Policy Support
Instrument was one of the conditions for Nigeria’s debt restructuring negotiations with
the Paris Club.

The PSI is a voluntary instrument requested by a member of the IMF in order to get IMF
approval for its economic policies. According to the ‘PSI Factsheet’ on the IMF website,
the PSI which was introduced in October 2005 to “enable[] the IMF [] support lowincome countries that do not want or need Fund financial assistance”. “The PSI will help
countries design effective economic programs, and, once approved by the IMF’s
Executive Board, will signal to donors, multilateral development banks, and markets the
Fund’s endorsement of a member’s policies”.

This paper intends to discuss the PSI using Nigeria as a reference point. What exactly is
the PSI about and what is its purpose? How is it different from similar IMF instrument(s)
which are currently operational? What is the modus operandi of the PSI? What are the

1

eligibility criteria for the PSI? What is the standard of assessment to be used in evaluating
a PSI? These and more will be the focus of this research paper.

Introduction
The IMF as an International Financial Institution
The time of unprecedented cooperation and optimism towards the end of World War II
and the determination to avoid mistakes of the past led to the signing of the Bretton
Woods agreement by forty-four countries and the establishment of the IMF for the
purpose of maintaining exchange rates for free international trade.1 Generally the
purpose of the IMF (‘the Fund’) among other things is to “promote international
monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for
consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems; to facilitate the
expansion and balanced growth of international trade; to promote exchange stability; and
to assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current
transactions between members”2

Membership of the IMF necessarily implies certain expectations and obligations on its
Members. First every member of the IMF must keep the other members informed of its
economic policies. This method of reporting is through the institutional structure of the
IMF. The contents of the report generally include information on its economy, its micro
and macroeconomic policies, fiscal and monetary policies, administrative framework etc,
1

See generally Andres Velasco and Emre Deliveli, The International Monetary Fund: Origin, Objectives,
Controversies
and
Challenges
(2003),
available
at
http://www.clubmadrid.org/cmadrid/fileadmin/Velasco_Deliveli_Final__Oct_18.pdf (last visited February
18 2006).
2
See generally IMF Articles of Agreement art. I, which states the purposes of the IMF.
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all of which the IMF documents and makes available to all its members. This information
keeps members informed about the economic affairs of others and to make decisions
according to the information circulated.

Next, every member is expected to watch out for the interests of the other members. By
this, it means that members should not engage in trade and economic policies that are
deliberately adverse to the interests of the others. In other words, the old system of
‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ policies3 is to be avoided at all costs. This necessarily implies that
every country must run its economy responsibly.

Thirdly and most importantly, as an international financial institution, lending to solve
the balance of payment difficulties of its members is arguably the Fund’s most important
activity. Consequently IMF members can expect the Fund to bail them out of balance of
payment difficulties. Balance of payment problems arise where there is a shortage of
foreign exchange to finance a country’s various obligations. This deficit occurs where a
country’s imports far outstrip its exports such that it spends more foreign exchange than it
earns. This leads to a situation where there is scarce hard currency for a country to meet
its trading obligations and its debt servicing obligations. As a lender of last resort
therefore, the IMF often has to put up the money to bail out countries that find
themselves in such difficulty.
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This is a system in the time before the Great Depression where countries increased trade barriers and
engaged in competitive devaluations to make their goods cheaper and more attractive. The end-result was
the total collapse of international trade where everyone ended up worse off.
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The IMF’s Main Activities4
In order for the IMF to achieve its objectives, it performs certain activities. These
activities are in three categories. I have already spoken about the lending activity of the
fund in the preceding paragraph. The second activity of the Fund is the surveillance
missions which it carries out regularly in its member countries. In today's globalized
economy, where the economic and financial policies of one country may affect many
other countries, international cooperation to monitor economic developments on a global
scale is essential. The IMF provides the mechanism for this cooperation. Under Article
IV of its Articles of Agreement, the IMF has a mandate to exercise surveillance over the
exchange rate policies of its members in order to ensure the effective operation of the
international monetary system.5 In 1977, an Executive Board decision6 recognized that
the IMF's appraisal of exchange rate policy requires a comprehensive analysis of the
general economic situation and policy strategy of each member country. The decision
also emphasized that the ultimate objective of surveillance is to help member countries
achieve financial stability and sustainable economic growth.

“Article IV consultations”, as IMF surveillance missions are known, usually take place
once a year. IMF economists visit the member country to gather information and hold
discussions with government and central bank officials, and often private investors, labor
representatives, members of parliament, and civil society organizations. Upon its return,
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For more information on the IMF’S activities, see “The IMF at Work” at http://www.imf.org.
IMF Articles of Agreement art. IV, para. 3.
6
Decision No 5392- (77/63), April 29 1977, available at http://www.imf.org.
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the mission submits a report to the IMF's Executive Board for discussion. The Board's
views are subsequently summarized and transmitted to the country's authorities.7

Third, the IMF provides countries with technical assistance and training in its areas of
expertise i.e. macroeconomic policy, tax policy and revenue administration, expenditure
management, monetary policy, the exchange rate system, financial sector sustainability,
and macroeconomic and financial statistics. Technical assistance is one of the benefits of
IMF membership. It is normally provided free of charge to any requesting member
country, within IMF resource constraints. In order to strengthen the effectiveness of IMF
technical assistance, measures are taken to integrate it more closely with surveillance and
lending programs.8

Supporting all three of these activities is IMF work in economic research and statistics.

The IMF’s Evolving Role to its Borrowing Members
Throughout its existence, the IMF has had to be creative in the facilities it adopts for the
benefit of its Members. Policies of the IMF often evolve with demand and situations but
always remain within the three core activities of the IMF i.e. lending, surveillance, and
technical assistance.

Stand-by Arrangements9

7

See “Surveillance- A Factsheet” available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm
See “Technical Assistance- A Factsheet” available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/tech.htm
9
“Financial Organization and Operations of the IMF” (Pamphlet Series No. 45 6th ed. 2001), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pam/pam45/pdf/pam45.pdf (last visited May 1 2006)
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The earliest facility of the IMF was the “Stand-by” arrangement created in the 1950s. The
bulk of IMF lending is provided under short- term “Stand- by” Arrangements that address
balance of payments difficulties of a temporary or cyclical nature.

The “Stand-by” Arrangement is a decision of the IMF by which a member is assured that
it will be able to make purchases (drawings) from the General Resources Account (GRA)
up to a specified amount and during a specified period of time, usually one to two years,
provided that the member observes the terms set out in the supporting arrangement. The
arrangement is normally conditional on a country adopting and implementing a program
of economic reforms affecting major macroeconomic variables such as the exchange rate,
money and credit, and the fiscal deficit. Moreover, the financing provided by the IMF is
temporary, to be repaid when macroeconomic imbalances have been rectified, and
economic performance has improved. All credit outstanding incurs interest at the IMF’s
basic rate of charge which is based on market interest rates and can be subject to
surcharges depending on the type and duration of the loan and the amount of IMF credit
outstanding.

Concessional Lending10
As time went on, a need arose to create a special facility for certain IMF members to
make IMF fund available to those members on better terms than the stand-by
arrangements. The IMF lends to poor countries at a concessional interest rate of ½ of 1
percent and over a longer repayment period than non-concessional IMF lending while
these countries restructure their economies to promote growth and reduce poverty. The
10

Id.
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IMF also provides assistance on a grant (no-cost) basis to heavily indebted poor countries
to help them achieve sustainable external debt positions. These activities are undertaken
separately from the IMF’s regular lending operations, with resources provided voluntarily
by members independently of their IMF capital subscriptions, and in part from the IMF’s
own resources.11

Providing Non-lending Support
With time, many countries which qualified for concessional lending realised that they no
longer needed financial assistance from the IMF. These countries had experienced some
form of growth and stability and were even able to access funds directly from the capital
markets. They therefore no longer needed the IMF’s “stand-by” arrangements or its
concessional lending facility. That was not to say however that they no longer needed
IMF assistance; except that this time, they would need the assistance in a new form.

The Policy Support Instrument
Background
Countries often provide bilateral assistance to other countries by making funds available
to them on a loan agreement. As with any lender-borrower relationship, there comes a
time when it is time for debt repayment. It is a common occurrence that the debtor has
difficulty in paying back its debt as and when due. In situations like this, especially when
there is a chronic shortage of funds for the repayment, the only option could be a default
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The IMF’s concessional assistance is extended through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF) Trust and in the context of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative through the
PRGF-HIPC Trust, both of which the IMF operates as Trustee.
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on the loan.12 In order to prevent situations of debt default therefore, it becomes
necessary for a country to re-negotiate its debts with its creditors.

Generally, in order for a country to be able to generate enough money to meet its debt
obligations, it has to be able to increase its foreign exchange receipts through its
earnings, or borrow more money i.e. re-financing. Although it is possible to re-finance
loans through the IMF, there are several good reasons why a country would not want to
borrow from the IMF in order to repay a loan. Chief among the reasons is the
conditionalities which are a typical feature of IMF loans.13 It could also be that the
country believes it can increase its revenue in order pay off its loans by following
appropriate policies without resorting to more borrowing. More borrowing is just a case
of re-financing- it does not erase the debt. An increase in income could be achieved
through a reduction in consumption; an increase in sales revenue i.e. reduced imports
and increased exports; or by reduced government expenditure. Achieving these
objectives will require the right policies being put in place. These policies if properly
planned and managed will guarantee the generation of income to meet debt obligations.

In debt restructuring deals therefore, creditors often find themselves in a position where
they want to ensure that the proper policies are being followed that will generate the
income that will pay off the debts owed to them. This is where the IMF comes in. The
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A default is when a country cannot raise the money needed to pay off its debts, and therefore decides
unilaterally not to pay the debt. For e.g. During the last week of 2001 facing the impossibility to meet debt
payments, Argentina defaulted on the larger part of the public debt, totaling no less than 93,000 million
dollars.
13
On conditionalities in the IMF generally, see “International Monetary Fund: Guidelines on
Conditionality” (September 2002), available at http://www.imf.org
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IMF as a credible international institution is often called upon to give its stamp of
approval on the economic policies of a country. The IMF as an institution to which the
creditor and the debtor both belong, acts as an intermediary to facilitate the debt
restructuring discussions. The way it does this is financing part of the debtor country’s
debt by lending it a portion of the total debt obligation. The participation of the IMF in
any package on a country’s debt restructuring sends a positive signal to the creditor(s). In
fact, it gives the creditor comfort that the IMF is involved and makes it more willing to
restructure the debt. It is this role of the IMF that led to the Policy Support Instrument.

Creating the PSI
As part of its ongoing reforms, the IMF is creating new policies, while retiring old and
redundant policies.14 The new policies are to respond to new demands as they arise. The
Policy Support Instrument (PSI) is one of these new policies of the IMF. It was brought
about as a result of the review of the IMF’s medium term strategy, as an additional
means of supporting its low-income members.15

The idea of a non-lendingprogram was first mooted at the IMFC Meeting in April 2004
where the United States Secretary of the Treasury reopened IMF consideration of a
mechanism through which the IMF could provide support for Members without
lending:16
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“Debt Relief, Globalisation, and IMF Reform: Some Questions and Answers By IMF Staff” (April 2000)
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200b.htm (last visited April 28 2006)
15
“Strengthening the IMF’s Support for Low-Income Countries” (September 2005) available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2005/092105.htm (last visited May 3 2006)
16
Institute for International Economics (IIE), “A Strategy for IMF Reform” p.102, available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/3985/05iie3985.pdf (last visited May 1 2006)
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[t]o strengthen its policy role, we favour the development of a new form of
engagement for countries that do not have a financing need. Under this
proposal, the IMF could assess an economic program prepared by the
country itself and signal its view to donors, MDBs [Multilateral
Development Banks) and markets. Such a non-borrowing vehicle for close
engagement would benefit both poor countries and emerging market
countries as it will show that a country has clear ownership of its policies
and is strong enough to stand on its own feet”

By April 2005, the IMFC had signed up and expressed support for the US proposition on
the basis that the proposed mechanism would be analogous to a grant of policy
endorsement without financial resources.17

Features of the PSI
The PSI is a non-lending program. It is often resorted to when a country no longer
requires IMF funding, but it needs the IMF to endorse its economic policies in order to
send a positive signal to the world that it is pursuing strong economic objectives which
make it a veritable destination for investing.

The PSI is one alternative among the range of facilities from which low-income
countries can choose their desired form of engagement with the IMF. As a policy, it was
17

Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the
International Monetary Fund held on April 16 2005 in Washington DC, par.12 “[the committee] also looks
forward to further work on a policy monitoring arrangement to enhance the IMF's signaling role for
countries that do not need or want IMF financing.”
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introduced in October 2005, and its purpose is to enable the IMF to support low-income
countries that do not want or need its financial assistance. The way it does this is by
helping countries design effective economic programs, and once these programs are
approved by the IMF’s executive board, it will signal to the donors and creditors alike
that the IMF endorses those programs, which will in turn reassure those donors and
creditors. The PSI aims to: (i) promote a close policy dialogue between the IMF and a
member country; (ii) provide more frequent Fund assessments of a member’s economic
and financial policies than is available through the regular consultation process, known
as surveillance; and (iii) deliver clear signals on the strength of these policies.18

The PSI is voluntary and is a complement to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF).19 Some of the key features of the PSI are as follows20:

•

Program targets and structural reforms should be based upon a country’s poverty
reduction strategy to help ensure policy ownership;

•

Programs should meet the same high standards as under a Fund financial
arrangement;

•

PSIs will have a fixed schedule of reviews to assess program implementation,
with reviews normally scheduled semiannually. Only limited flexibility will be

18

“The Policy Support Instrument- A Fact sheet”, available at www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm
The PRGF was created to make the objectives of poverty reduction and growth more central to IMF
lending to its poorest members. PRGF-supported programs are framed around comprehensive countryowned Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). PRSPs are prepared by governments with the active
participation of civil society and other development partners. After these are considered by the IMF and the
World Bank, it forms the basis for concessional lending and debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
20
See supra note 18.
19
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allowed in the timing of the reviews, and the Board will conduct reviews
irrespective of the status or prospects of program implementation;
•

The provision of timely and accurate information from the member with a PSI
will be essential for the Fund’s assessments. A framework for dealing with
possible cases of misreporting will be in place to safeguard the integrity of IMF
assessments;

•

In the event of a shock, an on-track PSI could provide the basis for rapid access
to PRGF resources through the Fund’s new Exogenous Shocks Facility21;

•

The publication of PSI documents is voluntary, but presumed. This is a similar
policy to the one in effect for PRGF documents.

•

The PSI will be reviewed after a three- year period to determine its success.

The PSI is not available to all IMF member countries. It is only available to PRGFeligible members with a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in place. The member country
has to make a request for the PSI, and in making this request it has to submit a Letter of
Intent which describes the policies the member intends to implement in the context of its
request for a PSI from the IMF. Nigeria was the first country to request a PSI on October
6, 2005, and this was approved on October 17, 2005.

21

The Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) provides policy support and financial assistance to low-income
countries facing exogenous shocks [An exogenous shock is an event that has a significant negative impact
on the economy and that is beyond the control of the government e.g. commodity price changes, natural
disasters, and conflicts and crises in neighboring countries that disrupt trade]. It is available to countries
eligible for the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) Financing terms are equivalent to a PRGF
arrangement and more concessional than under other IMF emergency lending facilities. Through the ESF,
the IMF can offer assistance in the form of quick-disbursing loans to meet immediate balance of payments
needs, and by providing a signal on the adequacy of policies. IMF lending also can help to attract more
concessional assistance from donors. For more information on the ESF, see “The Exogenous Shocks
Facility- A Fact Sheet”, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm
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Nigeria and the Policy Support Instrument
Tracing Nigeria’s Debt History22
The origin of Nigeria’s external debt dates back to 1958 when a sum of US$28 million
was contracted for railway construction.23 By the late 1970s to the early 1980s, the oil
glut in the international market had put Nigeria in a precarious position. The sharp fall in
oil prices and dramatic reduction in domestic oil production led to a sharp deterioration in
the balance of payments and government finances. Nigeria found it difficult to cope with
this situation to the extent that its foreign reserves dropped from US$10billion in 1980 to
US$3.9billion in 1981. The government’s response to this crisis was to finance the
deficits by borrowing, drawing down of external reserves and accumulation of arrears on
external trade payments. Meanwhile spending remained high largely financed by external
borrowing from bilateral and multilateral credit sources. Subsequent years saw
widespread mismanagement of funds and corruption by successive governments.
Refinancing was the principal means of dealing with the debt situation. The situation was
not helped any by the global interest rates with LIBOR going up by about 10% between
the early 1980s and 1989. By 2005, Nigeria’s total external debt had risen to
US$36.2billion.24 Of this total sum, US$30.8 was owed to Nigeria’s Paris Club
creditors.25

22

See generally N.E. Ogbe, Evaluation of Nigeria’s Debt Relief Experience 1985-1990 Research Program
on Financial Policies for the Global Dissemination of Economic Growth (Working Paper No.55 March
1992); Lex Rieffel Resolving Nigeria’s Paris Club Debt Problem: A Case of Non-Performing Creditors
(August 2005)
23
Central Bank of Nigeria, “Structure of External Debt” available at
http://www.cenbank.org/paymentsystems/externa_debt.htm (last visited May 8 2006)
24
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/news/page_detail_news.php?FICHIER=com11297988840 (last visited
April 15 2006)
25
The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors. Its origin dates back to 1956 when Argentina
met with its sovereign creditors in Paris to arrange a debt rescheduling in order to stave off an economic
catastrophe. Till date, the Paris club meets in Paris regularly to consider appeals from debtor nations on
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Debt Restructuring with the Paris Club
As part of the conditions for the Paris Club restructuring Nigeria’s debt, the country’s
authorities were to have obtained approval for a PSI from the IMF.26 This approval was
received from the IMF on October 17, after which the representatives of the Paris Club
creditor countries met on 18, 19 and 20 October 2005 and agreed with the representatives
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on a comprehensive treatment of its debt. This
agreement was to be implemented in two phases in consonance with the implementation
of the PSI. In the first phase, Nigeria would pay arrears due on all categories of debts and
Paris Club creditors would grant a 33% cancellation of eligible debts. In the second
phase, after the approval of the first review of the PSI by the Executive Board of the IMF
in March 2006, the Nigerian Government will pay amounts due under post-cut off date
debt, Paris Club creditors will grant a further tranche of cancellation of 34% on eligible
debts, and Nigeria will buy back the remaining eligible debts. In total, this agreement
allows Nigeria to obtain a debt cancellation estimated at US$18 billion (including
moratorium interest) representing an overall cancellation of about 60% of its debt to the
Paris Club of around US$30 billion. Paris Club creditors will be paid an amount of
US$12.4 billion, representing regularization of arrears of US$6.3 billion, plus a balance
of US$6.1 billion to complete the exit strategy.27

debt restructuring. Its members include the U.K, the U.S, France, Japan, Australia, Canada, Austria,
Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
and Russia.
26
Paris Club Press Release June 29 2005, “Paris Club creditors are ready to invite Nigeria to negotiate in
Paris as soon as it has concluded a policy support instrument with the IMF”, available at
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/news/page_detail_news.php?FICHIER=com11201201230 (last visited April
15 2006)
27
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/news/page_detail_news.php?FICHIER=com11297988840 (last visited
April 15 2006).
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Nigeria’s Policy Support Instrument
As part of the conditions to be met before getting a PSI approval, the requisite
documentation is: a letter of intent, a policy statement, and a technical memorandum of
understanding to be prepared by the country requesting the PSI. The letter of intent,
addressed to the Managing Director of the IMF, requests the “assessment and
endorsement of the policies by the [IMF] under a two-year [PSI] arrangement”.28 The
policy statement on the other hand outlined the “broad macroeconomic objectives and
policies for 2005 and for the medium term… based on the National Economic
Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS)…”29 The NEEDS program is
Nigeria’s economic development map. It was wholly prepared by Nigeria’s Ministry of
Finance, and had been presented and discussed under previous IMF Article IV
missions.30 The technical memorandum of understanding between the Nigerian
authorities and the IMF sets out the definitions of performance targets as well as
reporting requirements for the Nigerian reform program supported under the PSI.

The first review of Nigeria’s PSI has been carried out, fulfilling the criterion that a review
is to be carried out every 6 months.31 As a result of the approval of the PSI, Nigeria
finally exited the Paris Club.

28

“Nigeria: Authorities’ Letter, Policy Statement, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding”.
Id.
30
See infra note 35
31
According to IMF Press Release No 06/73 dated April 17, 2006, the first review of Nigeria’s PSI has
been carried out and approved by the Executive Board of the IMF.
29
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The Advantages of the PSI as a Non-Borrowing Program
If the PSI stays true to its blueprint, there are quite a number of benefits that could be
derived from such a program. The potentially most important benefit of the PSI is its
signaling function. Many countries which have achieved a level of stability in their
economies no longer require IMF funding for balance of payments difficulties (it should
be remembered that IMF lending is basically for this purpose). This does not mean that
they no longer require funds; but the kinds of funds needed this time around are for
development purposes. These funds are better sourced from the capital market because of
the huge amounts involved. However, because the operators of the market would need an
analysis of the macro framework before they release the funds, the approval of a PSI
would confirm to these countries that the right policies are in place in order to ensure a
good chance of the repayment of the debt. The same logic goes for donors. There is an
additional benefit to this: Once the IMF approves a PSI, there is no need for the creditor
or donor to conduct an independent analysis of its own and it can be rest assured that a
proper examination has been carried out, especially as they do not have the wide-reaching
efficiency and experience that the IMF has. This result can be seen in Nigeria’s debt
restructuring with the Paris Club. The conclusion of a PSI was a condition for
renegotiating Nigeria’s debt with the Paris Club.32 Without a PSI, the Paris Club creditors
would still have wanted some guarantee as to the viability of Nigeria’s economy to show
that it was serious about its economic reforms that would guarantee that it could repay its
debt and refrain from accumulating further debt, and it would have had to carry out an
independent analysis of its own.

32

See supra note 26
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Again, the PSI does not increase the country’s indebtedness to the IMF in any way. A
continuation of an IMF program supported by borrowing from the Fund raises debt
levels higher than they need to be in many countries. In the past, the IMF had to make
loans even where the loans were not needed for balance of payments purposes. This
situation occurred, for example, where donors to a country needed the IMF program to
validate the fiscal and monetary policies of the country, but where the country does not
have a balance of payments problem in the usual sense, without the PSI, IMF loans were
being made to countries and then being rolled over because they were the only way to
provide the important seal of approval to donors and/or the multilateral development
banks.33 With the PSI, now the IMF can support a country’s economic recovery without
the necessity of extending the IMF’s funds which would increase the country’s
indebtedness.

One of the more endearing features of the PSI is that the country requesting the PSI
prepares the policy statement for which it requires IMF support, by itself. The role of the
IMF then is to review the policies and by employing its expertise, making the policies
more effective. The user of the PSI thus has the advantage of developing its policies as
well as employing the IMF’s core competencies in macroeconomic, fiscal, and monetary
issues i.e. the policies are a “home-grown” initiative with the backing of the IMF to show
that it is a policy that has the potential to deliver good economic returns. This in turn
signals to the international financial markets, donors, and creditors that the country has
strong economic policies that qualify it for debt relief, future lending, or donations. Like

33

John B. Taylor, The Policy Support Instrument: A Key Component of the Recent IMF Reform MovementRemarks prepared for the conference on IMF Reform Institute for International Economics Washington DC
September 23, 2005.
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the US Secretary of the Treasury said while making a case for a policy surveillance
framework, “it will show that a country has clear ownership of its policies and is strong
enough to stand on its own feet.”34 Because the policies themselves are developed by the
country and not fostered on them by the IMF, countries are free to develop policies that
are tailored to their peculiar situation. In Nigeria’s case, its PSI is based on NEEDS, the
economic recovery program championed by the Ministry of Finance. The broad goals of
NEEDS could be summarized as poverty reduction, wealth creation, and employment
generation through the empowerment of the private sector and a reorientation of national
values.35

As an ancillary to the above point, the PSI compels the users of the program to stick to
the policies which they themselves have designed. In this way it serves as an
accountability mechanism. Because these countries are aware that a periodic review is
going to be carried out, there is more of an impetus to make the program succeed. This is
unlike in a situation where there is no outside supervision in which case there is always
the tendency of failure to see the policies through.
Concerns about the Policy Support Instrument

To the casual onlooker learning about the PSI, the first reaction usually is this: of what
use is such a policy that sounds incredibly similar to surveillance missions? Even though
the PSI has its merits, one wonders why there was the necessity of creating a separate

34

See supra note 16
Meeting Everyone’s Needs- National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy; Nigerian
National
Planning
Commission
Abuja
2004,
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Nigeria_PRSP(Dec2005).pdf (last visited April 28
2006)
35
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instrument when there already is in existence the yearly Article IV Consultations. It can
be argued that really the difference between the PSI and the Article IV consultations is
the same for the simple reason that at a base level, the PSI is about the IMF monitoring
the economic policies of a particular Member for a period of time in order to give its
stamp of approval and signal to the international community about the soundness of such
a country’s policies. Article IV Consultations could also fulfill the same purpose.
Usually, at the end of a surveillance mission, the IMF prepares a report that is available
to all its Member countries. This is a way of the IMF giving a feedback as to a country’s
policies. Anyone who needs to make a decision could as well look to the report of the
surveillance. The IMF could endorse a country’s policies or otherwise through the
surveillance report. Thus, it can be argued that the PSI s redundant.

However, saying that the PSI and Article IV consultations serve the same purpose is to
ignore the core differences between the two instruments. Though similar to Article IV
Consultations, the PSI plays a different role. Article IV consultations are merely reviews
of members’ economic standing. They are conducted annually basically to have a status
report of how each economy is doing and to make this information available globally.
According to the current IMF Managing Director, Rodrigo de Rato, “[surveillance is] the
international community’s chosen instrument to promote global financial and economic
stability.” In the consultation report that follows a surveillance mission, the country
authorities and the IMF both present their separate views on the state of the country’s
economy. The PSI is a bit more proactive than that however. The PSI is based on
policies designed specifically for a purpose, and not a review of existing policies. Here,
the requesting member makes a commitment to follow the laid down policies while the
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IMF’s part in the whole program is to approve and review the policies periodically. What
is required is the IMF’s ‘seal of approval’ for its economic policies. This would have the
effect of increasing its credibility in the international economy. In other words, the PSI is
a “signaling”36 instrument. If approved, it signals that a country is on the right track to
economic stability. The consultation report is not so much a signaling document as a
situation report; it alerts every other country as to the existing economic situation in
every other IMF member.

The PSI has to be approved before it can be implemented, and the member is bound by
the contents of the Policy Statement it submitted as a pre-condition of the PSI.
Moreover, the PSI has performance criteria attached to it, which have to be fulfilled in
order to determine the success of the program. These criteria are defined the technical
memorandum of understanding between the country and the IMF.

The targets of the consultation and the PSI also differ. The PSI is meant for low-income
countries that have made significant progress toward economic stability and no longer
require IMF financial assistance, while surveillance is applicable to every IMF member
country regardless of its economic strength.

Apart from the differences between the surveillance and PSI, another objection is the
voluntariness of the PSI. The letter of the PSI states that it is voluntary and purely
demand-driven.37 But is this really the case? In Nigeria’s case, getting approval for a PSI
was one of the conditions laid down by the Paris Club of creditors before its debt could

36

“Signaling refers to the information that [IMF] activities can indirectly provide about countries’
performances and prospects”, see supra note 18
37
See supra note 18
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be renegotiated.38 What this implies is that Nigeria did not request the PSI of its own
accord. While it may not be the IMF that applied the pressure, there was pressure from
some other quarter and this puts paid to the notion that the PSI is voluntary. The truth of
the matter is that the reason PSIs are requested is to satisfy conditions relating to the
grant of funds in one form or the other i.e. through donations, debt relief etc. If countries
are made to believe that without IMF support, they cannot receive outside funding, then
they would feel compelled to request the PSI. I must state however that this does not
conclude that the PSI is always coerced. In fact, Uganda has had its own PSI approved
by the IMF and there is nothing to show that it was coerced to request a PSI.39

The IMF, as well as other international financial institutions, is currently facing a
challenge to redefine itself and remain relevant in the global financial system. According
to Jerome Levinson,40 the new global financial environment has less and less use of these
international financial institutions in their current forms: China is emerging as a big
player in the global economy and making investments in many countries; Latin
American countries like Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil are no longer indebted to these
institutions; and African countries can now access funds from the capital markets. Thus
the IFIs are facing a crisis and need to reinvent themselves. It has been suggested that,

[I]t [the PSI] would be the IMF’s answer to the threat of losing control
over the economies of countries receiving debt cancellation. If the
38

See supra note 26.
It should be noted however that Uganda was the first country to qualify for debt relief under the HIPC
Initiative, and it also recently got 100% debt relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. See World
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governments could be pressured to take out a PSI- with the assertion that
they will need to demonstrate IMF approval in order to remain credit (and
grant) worthy, their subservience will be guaranteed without the IMF
having to put up any money.”41

It is therefore not farfetched to say that by creating the PSI, the IMF is creating an
extended role for itself. Since fewer countries need the IMF to provide bail-out funds, it
could be that the PSI is one way for the IMF to maintain some sort of relevance in the
economic policies of its weaker members. One commentator while criticizing Nigeria’s
‘debt relief’ package with the Paris Club complained about “the degrading conditionality
of obtaining a [PSI] from the [IMF] which Nigeria does not owe a single cent.”42

Finally, even though proponents tout one of the benefits of the PSI as the fact that the
IMF does not force its own policies on the recipients, the fact that the idea of the PSI
came from the Secretary of the U.S Treasury and approved by the other members of the
IMFC suggests that this really isn’t the case. It removes the feeling that it is a program
wholly developed by the recipient low-income countries.
Conclusion

Whatever concerns there are regarding the PSI, the IMF is to be commended for the spirit
behind the Policy Support Instrument. With this instrument, it is possible for countries on
their way to economic stability to showcase this fact to the rest of the world in order to
build some credibility. On April 17 2006, on completing the first review of Nigeria’s PSI,
41

Soren Ambrose, Analysis: Debt Cancellation Undermined to Expand IMF Power (2005), available at
http://www.50years.org/cms/updates/story/315 (last visited May 2 2006).
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the IMF issued a press release. In the release, the first deputy managing director of the
IMF, Anne Krueger made the following statement:

“Monetary policy [in Nigeria] is anchoring macroeconomic stability
…[s]ubstantial progress has been made in implementing the authorities
structural agenda, including an ambitious bank consolidation, the
liberalization of Nigeria's import tariff regime, the introduction of a
wholesale auction for foreign exchange, continued efforts to reduce
corruption, and progress in restructuring and privatizing state-owned
enterprises. The authorities will continue their strong structural agenda
including by further efforts to remove impediments to growth, and by
strengthening institutions through the passage of a Fiscal Responsibility
Bill, a public sector and civil service reform, improved governance and
transparency in the oil and gas sector, and the continued privatization or
strengthening of state-owned enterprises.”

Whether or not it is as a result of the PSI that the policies had some effect or they would
have had an effect whether or not there was a PSI in place is not the issue. What matters
is that as a result of this positive assessment, Nigeria was able to finally exit the Paris
Club. This is not likely to be the only dividend of this assessment. It remains to be seen
how other international institutions will respond to this. If all goes well, Nigeria should
see an increase in foreign direct investments, and international aid. All is not over yet
however. Nigeria’s PSI is for a period of two years. This is only the first review and there
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are three more reviews to come up by the time the program concludes in 2007. Therefore
the program must be sustained to ensure that the full potential of the program is reached.

On a final note however, to ensure that the PSI generates the goodwill and confidence of
the target recipients, it should not be subjected to the numerous conditionalities which are
a typical feature of IMF assistance to low-income countries. And it should operate “as a
transmission program for more successful countries to a less formal program of
surveillance and monitoring, rather than as an instrument for prolonged engagement by
the Fund.”43 Maybe then the PSI would fulfill its mission as described below,

[w]e consider the PSI as a potentially valuable means to strengthen
surveillance and signaling in low-income countries. By formalizing and
codifying a judicious combination of existing surveillance and lending
facilities including high standards of conditionality and review so as to
preserve the credibility of the Fund’s ‘seal of approval’, PSI could support
countries in safeguarding sound policies and in ensuring debt sustainability
when a formal financial arrangement is not called for. PSI could be
particularly useful for countries benefiting from debt cancellation…44
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